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Transatlantic steamers  
and nation building in the 
Kingdom of Sardinia  
(1830-1859)
Marco Mariano
As the mid-nineteenth century “transportation revolution” reshaped the Atlantic word, 
its impact reached Italian shores. Transatlantic steamship projects in the Kingdom of 
Sardinia were part of that transformation; they also reflected and reinforced a new, 
positive attitude toward the Americas and, specifically, the United States. Especially 
after 1848, this Atlantic reorientation of mental maps inside and outside political and 
economic circles in Turin and Genoa illustrated how the integration in the Atlantic 
space came to be seen as an opportunity in the pursuit of economic modernization 
and national unification. Finally, the tangle of interests and values surrounding trans-
atlantic steamship navigation ultimately intersected with the Risorgimento in two 
major ways. First, thinking of “America” as an opportunity helped shape an idea of 
national identity based on exchange, more than antagonism, with the other. Second, 
transatlantic steamship, which was often see as an extension of the railway network, 
became part of the material process of nation building. The fiasco of the Compag-
nia Transatlantica (1852) exemplifies some of the discursive elements and structural 
limitations of Italian modernization.
Keywords: Atlantic world, nation building, Italian states 
In february 1834 the Sardinian consul in Philadelphia, Angelo Garibaldi, sent the 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Turin a long dispatch discussing «se lo stabilimento di 
navi corriere coll’America può dare luogo ad un’emigrazione italiana». Garibaldi had 
already been pressuring the Sardinian government to sponsor the launch of steam-
ships between Genoa and the major ports of North America for several years, to no 
avail. In fact, his detailed analyses stressing the beneficial impact of transatlantic 
liners on trade and economic growth had only met with benign neglect in the capital 
of the Kingdom of Sardinia and all-out hostility in its major commercial hub. In the 
decades preceding Italian unification, however, several plans to establish steamship 
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routes started gaining traction among policymakers, the business community, and 
public opinion. One of the many reasons for this was an increase in the number of 
Ligurians traveling to the New World, mostly to the Río de la Plata region and Brazil, 
which was making transatlantic navigation more profitable and promising than ever, 
just as Garibaldi had anticipated from his distant North American outpost1.
Consuls were uniquely positioned to detect developing trends at the international 
and transnational level. After the Restoration and the wave of Latin American inde-
pendences, as new states entered the international arena, consular networks gradu-
ally freed themselves from their traditional role as a «Cinderella service» and became 
part of the «fabrique du national»2. While in the early modern era consuls had usually 
been chosen from among merchant communities based in foreign ports to act as 
their representatives, now they were expected to participate in the nation-building 
process and the pursuit of the national interest. This was especially true in the Ameri-
cas, a relatively peripheral area of the international system where often consuls also 
carried out diplomatic functions as chargé d’affaires. However, at a time when the 
professionalization of the consular service was not yet complete, many officials took 
it upon themselves to implement the instructions they received from their headquar-
ters in personal and creative ways, depending on their political and cultural inclina-
tions, professional background, and, in some cases, private interests. 
Garibaldi’s long, detailed dispatches discussing the limits and potential of commer-
cial relations between Sardinia and the US in the context of the growing integration of 
the 1830s Atlantic economy are a case in point. At a time of entrenched conservatism 
and protectionism among both Turinese lawmakers and the Genoese business com-
munity he invariably and unsuccessfully made the case for a free-trade-oriented re-
form of Sardinia’s commercial legislation and advocated measures like the establish-
ment of a steamship route between Genoa and the ports of the North Eastern Ameri-
can coast. In the following decade several steamship projects that took shape thanks 
to the initiative of Genoese and French ship owners met with the same opposition 
among the political and business elite. Things were slowly changing, however. After 
the shock of 1848 radically altered the domestic and international context, within the 
policies pursued by Count Cavour and the liberal political discourse of the moderati 
transatlantic trade and investments in infrastructure as key elements of Piedmontese 
economic growth, on the one hand, and political stabilization and the projection of 
influence in Italy and Europe, on the other, came to be tightly intertwined. Finally, 
in the 1850s, the controversial and unfortunate case of the Compagnia transatlantica 
marked the culmination and ultimate failure of these early attempts to incorporate 
1 Archivio di Stato di Torino [hereafter: Ast], Consolati nazionali – Philadelphia, box 2, 7 february 1834.
2 M. Grenet, Consuls et «nations» étrangères: états des lieux et perspectives de recherche, «Cahiers de la 
Méditerranée», 93, 2016, p. 34.
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Genoa into the steamers’ routes that were reconfiguring the mid-nineteenth-century 
transatlantic space. 
This essay focuses on the rich and relatively obscure set of factors and discourses 
surrounding Sardinian transatlantic steamship projects more than on their noto-
riously negligible outcome, first because such projects reflected a reorientation of 
mental maps inside and outside political and economic institutions in Turin and 
Genoa – albeit a partial and limited one – and, second, because they anticipated 
post-unification developments. «America» had in fact long been part of the migra-
tory and business experience of Ligurians, for whom transatlantic mobility was a 
familiar resource3. In mid-nineteenth-century Piedmont, this notion was expanded 
and transformed by the increasing integration made possible by the «transportation 
revolution»4 and the improved transatlantic circulation of information (through the 
consular service, the press, and correspondence). In the aftermath of 1848 the idea 
that the Atlantic space was an opportunity in the pursuit of economic modernization 
and national unification gained traction and helped shape the outlook and decisions 
of liberal elites until war and diplomacy re-ermeged in the mid-1850s as the major 
instruments of nation building5. 
«Placés pour être à la fois une puissance continentale et maritime»
By the 1830s the transportation revolution was in full swing. While Garibaldi 
was developing his plans for transatlantic navigation in Philadelphia, Ferdinand de 
Lesseps, then the French consul in Alexandria and later Cairo, was starting to work 
on the Suez canal project. This revolution eventually had a global reach, but it mostly 
originated and unleashed its transformative potential in the Atlantic world6.
«Two new worlds have been opened to their industry, each of them much greater 
and more extensive than the old one, and the market of one of them growing still 
greater and greater every day». Garibaldi chose this well-known and oft-quoted pas-
sage from Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations concluding the chapter on «the ad-
vantages which Europe has derived from the discovery of America» as the epigraph 
to his Considérations politiques et commerciales sur les relations que les États de S.M. 
le Roi de Sardaigne pourraent avoir avec les Deux Amériques, which he sent to the 
3 A. Gibelli, La risorsa America, in A. Gibelli, P. Rugafiori (a cura di), Storia d’Italia. Le regioni, vol. XI La 
Liguria, Torino, Einaudi, 1994. 
4 G. Taylor, The transportation revolution, 1815-1860, New York, Rinehart & Co., 1951.
5 On economic liberalism as a unifying factor among advocates of reform see S. Soldani, Approaching Eu-
rope in the name of the nation: the Italian revolution 1846-49, in D. Dowe, H.-G. Haupt, D. Langewiesche, J. 
Sperber (eds.), Europe in 1848. Revolution and Reform, New York-Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2001. 
6 On the mid-19 century reconfiguration of the Atlantic space see M. Mariano, A history that «dares not 
speak its name»? Atlantic history, global history and the modern atlantic space, «Journal of transnational 
american studies», 2017, 1.
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Secretary of Foreign Affairs in late 1830. The ambitious, 107-page-long document 
typifies how consuls addressed the intersection of commercial and political factors 
that were redesigning the Atlantic world in the early decades of the modern era. In 
the same way, the deferential bow to Adam Smith exemplifies why liberal circles saw 
steamers as a force of progress that reduced transatlantic distances and increased 
trade. Like many of his contemporaries, Garibaldi celebrated «l’établissment de ces 
navires reguliers qui semblent avoir jeté un pont sur l’Atlantique et changé la loi des 
distances et des elements»7. 
The inauguration of the first packet route between New York and Liverpool by the 
Black Ball Company in 1818, followed in 1822 by the Red Star Line operating on the 
same route, led commentators to salute the beginning of a new era in transatlantic 
navigation and trade. Expectations became even more optimistic in the late 1830s 
when steam engines started travelling along the North Atlantic routes. The competi-
tion between the British Cunard Line and the American Collins Line, both lavishly 
subsidized by their governments, also showed how transatlantic navigation was as 
much about national prestige as it was about economic opportunity. Nor was it lim-
ited to the Anglo-American corridor. Le Havre, Bremen, and Hamburg were soon 
included in this web of connections, thus laying the foundations for mass migration 
from continental Europe to the «distant magnet» of North America8. 
Garibaldi, who followed the international debate on economic matters through 
publications like the «Foreign Quarterly Review» and the «Westminster Review», 
viewed the establishment of steamers between Genoa and New York as the key for 
developing Sardinian foreign trade, facilitating domestic growth, and eventually lay-
ing the groundwork for the Kingdom of Sardinia’s primacy in the Italian peninsula 
and its admission among the European powers. With the regularity of departures 
and arrivals and reduced travel time helping to cut prices, free trade would lead to an 
increase in the supply of goods and, according to the tenets of Say’s law, greater de-
mand. He subscribed to a view of economic development that valued commerce and 
industry over the mere exploitation of natural resources: «l’Espagne est restèe pauvre 
avec tous les trésors du Noveau Monde, l’Angleterre par son industrie est devenue la 
puissance la plus opulente».
At a time when Ligurians were mostly travelling to South America, Garibaldi ap-
propriated and circulated the internationally popular view whereby the trajectory of 
politically stable and economically prosperous North America was diverging from 
that of its southern counterpart. He associated the former to political stability, abun-
dance of natural resources, and economic and demographic growth and saw the 
7 Ast, Consolati nazionali – Philadelphia, box 2, 1830. 
8 K.J. Blume, Historical dictionary of the US maritime industry, Lanham, Scarecrow Press, 2012; P. Taylor, 
Distant magnet. European emigration to the USA, New York, Harper & Row, 1971.
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latter as dominated to «révolution permanente» and «une situation si incertaine et si 
agitée» that cast a long shadow on the future of the Southern hemisphere. 
In Garibaldi’s view, Piedmont had a real opportunity to play a role in that market 
thanks to its exports of manufactured goods related to the agricultural sector like silk 
and other textiles, as long as it adopted free-trade policies and invested in infrastruc-
ture like other European countries were doing. Such a course of action would have 
obvious political consequences. Genoa would prevail over other Italian ports like 
Leghorn, Naples, and Trieste and become the great hub of Mediterranean trade to 
and from the Americas, while Piedmont would bolster its hegemonic ambitions in 
Italy: «Placés pour être à la fois une puissance continentale et maritime, les États de 
S.M. sont par celle seule raison […] la premiere puissance de l’Italie. Elle doit jouer 
le rôle qui la Prusse a joué en Allemagne: sa destination est d’en être avec le temps 
le leading power». He believed it would be a peaceful process, in line with Adam 
Smith’s view on the relationship between trade and independence: «En donnant des 
bras et des trésors» – Garibaldi concluded – trade «donne les premiers éléments du 
pouvoir, et l’importance politique est étriotement lièe à l’importance commerciale»9.
These «Considérations» were the opening act of an argument between Garibaldi 
and officials in Turin and Genoa that would last until the consul died of tertian fever 
in 1835. His proposals on transatlantic liners, a bilateral treaty based on the «most 
favored nation» status, and a reduction in tariffs clashed with the strong protection-
ist bent of early 1830s Piedmont. However, they also helped introduce the Sardinian 
administration – namely the Secretaries of Interior and Foreign Affairs and the influ-
ential Chamber of Commerce of Genoa – to the international debate over free-trade 
policies as well as the potential and risks of transatlantic trade, a debate that spilled 
over into the press and the public arena in the decades preceding Italian unification.
In fact, Garibaldi did not stop at analyses and dispatches. In July 1832, he outlined 
a steamship project between New York and Genoa involving John J. Boyd, an agent 
for one of the companies operating on the Le Havre line, and Vincent Bouland, a 
French merchant and the Sardinian vice-consul in New York10. The strongest op-
position to his proposal came from the influential Genoa Chamber of Commerce. In 
several meetings, the body representing the Genoese business community dismissed 
Garibaldi’s plan as unrealistic and impracticable given the near irrelevant volume of 
bilateral exchanges11. However, such opposition also reflected both the unwillingness 
to open the Ligurian harbor to foreign vessels burdened by heavy duties and a wider 
protectionist inertia that in the 1830s started being questioned by cautious advocates 
9 Ast, Consolati nazionali – Philadelphia, box 2.
10 Ast, Consolati nazionali – Philadelphia, box 2, 19 luglio 1832.
11 Ast, Commercio, box 6, minutes of meetings of the Chamber of Commerce of Genoa, 14 october 1832, 
22 february 1833, 20 june 1834.
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of free trade like Giuseppe Papa in Genoa and Ilarione Petitti da Roreto in Turin12. For 
Genoese merchants, «America» meant mainly Brazil, the Río de la Plata region, and to 
some extent the Pacific coast from Chile and Peru to California, with North America 
playing a minor role. Political authorities in Turin concurred, since any friction over 
trade policies would hamper their efforts to ease tensions with the Genoese. In late 
1835, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs decided to stop funding the consulate general in 
Philadelphia, considered «certamente di molto minor considerazione»13 than the one 
just opened in Rio de Janeiro, which remained the major Sardinian post in the new 
world until the signing of the 1838 commercial treaty between Piedmont and the US. 
«L’Italia non dovrebbe rimanere immobile spettatrice»
Garibaldi’s attempts to increase commercial exchanges between Piedmont and 
the North Atlantic area suffered from his marginal position as a low ranking official 
based in a distant outpost. Between the late 1830s and the late 1840s, however, two 
external impulses altered the picture in significant ways. The assertive economic 
foreign policy of the US, which led to several commercial bilateral treaties between 
the US and European and Mediterranean countries, and the influence of the British 
debate over free trade, which culminated in the 1846 abolition of the Corn Laws, both 
helped reshape the Atlantic economic and political space, and the shockwaves of this 
transformation affected Italian shores. In the US, the «market revolution» of the 1820s 
and 1830s; the consequent rise in exports, which doubled between 1828 and 1836; 
and, finally, the election of Martin Van Buren, a whig who favored commercial over 
territorial expansion, collectively reinforced a faith in the virtues of trade that run 
deep in the American republican tradition and became particularly widespread and 
influential at this juncture. The first issue of «Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine», founded 
in New York in 1839 and a preacher of this faith, announced that «Commerce is now 
the lever of Archimedes and the fulcrum […] wanted to move the world, is found in 
the intelligence, enterprise, and wealth of the merchants and bankers, who now de-
termine the questions of peace and war, and decide the destinies of nations»14. Char-
acteristic policies of what advocates called a «new commercial era» included federal 
subsidies to navigation lines, a reform of the consular service, and commercial trea-
ties, which often reflected special and regional interests. Lobbying by tobacco plant-
12 E. Guglielmino, Genova dal 1814 al 1849. Gli sviluppi economici e l’opinione pubblica, Genova, R. Depu-
tazione di Storia Patria per la Liguria, 1940, pp. 114-117.
13 Ast, Consolati nazionali in generale, box 7, 12 october 1833. 
14 S. Wilentz, Society, politics and the market revolution, in E. Foner (ed.) The new American history, Phila-
delphia, Temple UP, 1997; K. Brauer, Diplomacy of American expansionism 1821-60, in W. Becker, S. Wells 
(eds.), Economics and world power, New York, Columbia University Press, 1984; J. Schroeder, Shaping a 
maritime empire. The commercial and diplomatic role of the American Navy, 1829-1861, Westport, Gree-
wood Press, 1985, p. 82.
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ers from Virginia and Maryland, for example, led to the creation of a special commis-
sion of the House of Representatives and the appointment of so-called tobacco agents 
to facilitate exports to central European markets15. Among these was Nathaniel Niles, 
a US executive agent in Vienna, who proposed to the Sardinian minister in Austria 
a «Treaty of commerce and navigation» aimed at securing the access of American 
tobacco to central Europe through Genoa. 
The 1838 treaty increased commercial exchanges between the two countries and 
helped call the attention of US merchants to the opportunities offered by Genoa at a 
time when the quest for Mediterranean alternatives to the traditional North Atlantic 
routes was seen as crucial for sustaining US economic growth16. American vessels 
thus became a familiar presence in the Ligurian harbor, increasing from 13 in 1837 to 
37 in 1842, while the total tonnage quadrupled and the value of goods tripled during 
the same time span17. American perceptions of the Sardinian economic and political 
environment were also evolving. In one of his books addressing the business com-
munity, John Martin Baker, a veteran of the US consular service in the Mediterranean 
and an influential analyst of US commercial policies, emphasized «the great desire of 
the sovereign of that Kingdom to improve the general trading business in Genoa, as 
well as to ameliorate the wants of its people». US officials provided similarly sympa-
thetic accounts after the establishment of the US legation in Turin in 184018.
On the Sardinian end the treaty became the blueprint for a number of agreements 
between Turin and other European and American nations. However, the initial boost 
in trade was soon followed by a stalemate that fueled disputes over the poor state of 
infrastructure and the detrimental effects of domestic taxation on transit, thus rein-
forcing the call for free-trade reform. Interaction with North American markets, leg-
islation, and business practices fueled a debate over «cognizioni utili», which spilled 
over into public opinion in the 1840s. For moderate liberals, integration into interna-
tional trade and investments in roads, railways, canals, and shipping routes were fun-
damental for the «emulazione» of European models that could allow Italy to achieve 
national unification and recover its ancient glory. 
15 Resolutions of the General Assembly of Maryland in Relation to a Reduction of the Duties Imposed by 
Foreign Nations on the Importation of Tobacco, 24th Congress, 2nd Session, 2 february 1837; Report of the 
Secretary of State upon the Subject of the Tobacco Trade between the United States and Foreign Countries, 
House Doc. n. 229, 26th Congress, 14 april 1840.
16 A. Gendebien, Sardinia and commercial reciprocity, 1819-38, «Journal of modern history», 1961, 1; M. 
Mariano, Trade, liners, treaties. Piedmontese consuls in the long Atlantic, 1819-1838, «Nuevo Mundo/Mun-
dos Nuevos», 2012, 2. 
17 «Commerce of the United States and Genoa», Hunt’s Merchants Magazine, 1 marzo 1844. For a general 
view see G. Doria, Investimenti e sviluppo economico a Genova alla vigilia della prima guerra mondiale, 
vol. 1 Le premesse, Milano, Giuffrè, 1969, pp. 68-9. 
18 J.M. Baker, A View of the commerce of the United States and the Mediterranean sea ports, Philadelphia, 
Barrington & Murphy, 1847, p. 58. On the high expectations on the potential of the treaty for American trade 
see among others «New York Evening Post», 23 november 1839.
160
The debate over the US-Sardinian treaty and its consequences interplayed with 
the new climate generated in Genoa and Turin by the echo of the British turn toward 
free trade. The abolition of the Corn Laws had a strong impact on public opinion, as 
demonstrated by the triumphant Italian tour of Richard Cobden during the first half 
of 1847. In 1843, Cesare Balbo, a leader of moderate Piedmontese liberals, launched 
a plan for a customs union between the Italian states that pitted free trade against 
Austrian protectionism. Three years later, he celebrated the British embrace of free 
trade policies and urged taking full advantage by investing in railways as a necessary 
complement. In 1845, Count Cavour predicted the triumph of Cobden’s Anti-Corn 
Law league as a turning point that would transform the economy of Britain and the 
world19.
British developments famously fueled a wave of anglophilia among liberals and 
high profile members of the Sardinian government as well as radical republicans and 
exiles20. Significantly, this also prompted political and intellectual elites to start form-
ing a new attitude toward the US. Long seen as simply a peripheral extension of the 
British empire or dismissed as a source of dangerous equalitarianism and cultural 
barbarism, the North American republic was now being credited as a success story. 
The first echoes of Toqueville’s Démocratie en Amérique also helped trigger interest 
in, and often sympathy for, the US across political lines21. Since his visit to Paris in 
1835, Cavour had been struck by the broader implications of Tocqueville’s analysis of 
American society, namely the tension between the spread of political power and the 
concentration of economic resources22. Finally, the revolutions of 1848 only acceler-
ated this change of attitude. In his writing on «representative monarchy» Balbo openly 
expressed his admiration for the «moderazione, sapienza, esemplarità delle repub-
bliche rappresentative americane», which he contrasted with what were seen as the 
overly abstract and quixotic inclinations of European proponents of republicanism. 
As Balbo wrote immediately after the cataclysm of 1848, the American revolution 
was laudable because «dal principio al fine fu in essa una moderazione, un non pre-
tendere se non al possibile ed all’indispensabile, un non fare mai niuna mutazione 
inutile o non necessaria […] esempio unico tra le rivoluzioni antiche e moderne»23.
19 R. Romani, The Cobdenian Moment in the Italian Risorgimento, in A. Howe, S. Morgan (eds.), Re-thinking 
nineteenth-century liberalism. Richard Cobden bicentenary essays, Aldershot Hants, Ashgate, 2006, pp. 120-21.
20 M. Isabella, Risorgimento in Esilio. L’internazionale liberale e l’età delle rivoluzioni, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 
2011 [Oxford, 2009].
21 M. Ridolfi, La Démocratie en Amérique e la sua ricezione nell’Italia del Risorgimento, in D. Fiorentino, 
M. Sanfilippo (eds.), Gli Stati Uniti e l’Unità d’Italia, Roma, Gangemi, 2004. A rich, wide-ranging analysis 
of the complex, changing attitudes toward the US among Italian political thinkers is provided by A. Körner, 
America in Italy. The United States in the political thought and imagination of the Risorgimento, 1763-1865, 
Princeton, Princeton Unversity Press, 2017.
22 R. Romeo, Cavour e il suo tempo, vol. I, 1810-1842; Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1971, pp. 481-82,; vol. II, 1842-54, 
1977, pp. 453-54.
23 C. Balbo, Della monarchia rappresentativa in Italia, Firenze, Le Monnier, 1857, p. 72.
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Both the political institutions and the economic policies of the US were seen in a 
new light at a time when Piedmont was emerging as a constitutional monarchy open 
to free trade. It is no accident that Cobden singled out the US as well as Britain in his 
speech in Genoa, which catalyzed the attention of reformers, scholars, and policy-
makers and, thanks to Petitti, was published in the influential «Annali Universali di 
Statistica»: 
Gli Stati Uniti hanno una tariffa doganale che è forse la più moderata del mondo, eppure 
in quel paese i nove decimi della pubblica rendita provengono dalle dogane. In Inghilterra 
dove da venticinque anni gradatamente ci siamo avviati verso la libertà degli scambi un terzo 
dell’ingente nostra rendita pubblica ricavasi dalle dogane. In Francia un decimo soltanto delle 
tasse ritraesi da quella sorgente, ma quel paese non ha ancor fatto che il prima passo nella via 
della riforma della propria tariffa. Quanto alla Spagna, dove il sistema vincolante fin qui regna 
esclusivamente appena un tredicesimo dei tributi è ricavato dalle dogane24.
It is within this evolving economic and political framework that «America» – un-
derstood in broad terms as the continents beyond the Atlantic – became a greater 
magnet than ever. Emigration to the Americas was now a major source of revenue 
for Genoese ship owners operating along transatlantic routes. According to estimates, 
some 15.000 people left Genoa for the Americas between 1833 and 1850. Two thirds 
were directed to the Río de la Plata region and about 16% to the US. In the following 
decade, the number rose to over 30.000. Factors like familiarity with Atlantic trade, 
incentives for immigration from South American governments, revenue from the 
flow of remittances, and the possibility to adapt mid-size sailing ships to the trans-
port of passengers at little cost all helped transatlantic migration drive the Genoese 
economy. On the one hand, this lucrative business generated revenue that compen-
sated for a chronic lack of liquidity, thus boosting the careers of ship owners like 
Battista Lavarello, Rocco Piaggio, and Carlo Raggio who would play major roles in 
subsequent decades. On the other hand, the increasing flow of passengers secured a 
safe source of revenue that paradoxically discouraged technological improvements 
like the transition from sail to steam25. 
During the 1840s, at least four projects to establish liners between Genoa and the 
Americas were developed by Genoese or French ship owners and submitted to au-
24 I. Petitti da Roreto, Cobden a Genova. Lettera al Compilatore sull’adunanza tenutasi a Genova per il rino-
mato sig. Cobden, «Annali Universali di Statistica», Serie 2, vol. 11, f. 31, 1847 p. 105.
25 M. Doria, L’economia del mare: le navi e i porti, in G. Assereto, M. Doria (a cura di), Storia della Liguria, 
Roma-Bari, Laterza 2007; E. Tonizzi, L’emigrazione e lo sviluppo della marina mercantile. Un’ipotesi di 
lavoro, in I fenomeni migratori dalla provincia di Genova nei secoli XIX e XX, Genova, Tipografia della 
provincia di Genova, 1988; F. Fauri, Storia economica delle migrazioni italiane, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2015, 
pp. 52-60; A. Molinari, Porti, trasporti, compagnie, in P. Bevilacqua, A. De Clementi, E. Franzina (a cura di), 
Storia dell’emigrazione italiana, vol. 1 Partenze, Roma, Donzelli, 2001, pp. 237-46.
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thorities in Turin and Genoa, thus triggering an unprecedented conversation about 
America as an opportunity for the Piedmentese economy and society among political, 
commercial, and financial circles. Proponents of these plans echoed the arguments 
and topoi of the debate emerging in the public arena: the close connection between 
railway and navigation networks, with the latter seen as the natural extension of the 
former; the emulation of the British model, which was being adopted across conti-
nental Europe; and the need to include Genoa, and by extension Sardinia, as inter-
national economic players in the rising transatlantic trade. Thus ensued an Atlantic 
reorientation of traditional mental maps which, albeit limited and partial, anticipated 
later developments.
In 1841 Giovanni Battista Venzano proposed to the Genoese Intendenza – the au-
thority supervising the harbor – that a company of steamers be established between 
Genoa and «America meridionale» based on a 15-year exclusive license conceded by 
the Sardinian government. As France and Belgium began taking measures to cre-
ate similar transatlantic communications, Venzano wrote in his business proposal: 
«l’Italia non meno intraprendente in commercio e in navigazione di ogni altra nazi-
one non dovrebbe rimanere immobile spettatrice dei vantaggi e dei lucri che le altre 
genti a danno del suo commercio procacciansi col mezzo di questa navigazione al 
lungo corso». Profits would be guaranteed by the amount of goods as well as by «the 
great number of wayfarers who, as we know, travel from one continent to the other 
with sailing vessels, and many with steamers via England». This was especially true 
in the light of the projected government investments in railways: 
Sarebbe di utile infinito all’intrapresa delle suddette strade ferrate, poiché le alimenterebbe 
del maggior trasporto di merci e passeggeri, e buon numero di questi attese la sollecitudine, e 
la facilità colla quale viaggerebbero e i comodi che loro presenterebbero i suddetti stabilimenti, 
intraprenderebbero facilmente il viaggio dall’Europa all’America e viceversa, quale per affari di 
commercio, quale per diporto, per istruzione d’industria, per le arti, per le scienze e per tanti altri 
motivi che non possono che tornare al pubblico giovamento ed all’incremento del commercio26.
Venzano’s proposal had also been spurred by information from the Sardinian con-
sul in Marseille about the establishment by the Société Méditerranéo-Transatlantique 
of liners connecting the major French port on the Mediterranean with the Caribbean. 
In the mid-19th century Atlantic world, the proliferation of investment plans in rail-
ways and steamers, often covered enthusiastically by the press, usually originated 
at the intersection between transnational business networks and national policies. 
In the Kingdom of Sardinia a discourse of nation building, which emphasized how 
steamers were instrumental for competing with other nations in the international 
26 Ast, Marina – Commercio e Navigazione, box 501; Archivio di Stato di Genova [hereafter: Asg], Camera 
di Commercio, minutes of meetings, box 509, 28 september 1841.
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markets, played an unmistakable role. A similar proposal advanced in 1842 by a 
ship owner based in Rouen was dismissed by the Chamber of Commerce as «un 
bel sogno economico-commerciale»27. In 1847 C. Le Chevalier, a Martinique-born 
French ship owner, outlined a more ambitious and detailed plan for the creation 
of a postal service between Genoa, South America, the Caribbean, and the US. His 
proposal reiterated familiar arguments: the commercial opportunities provided by 
transatlantic routes; the competition with similar French and Spanish projects aimed 
at creating new connections between the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic; and 
the beneficial effects of state subsidies to steamships in Britain and the US. It also 
stressed that the forthcoming opening of the Suez canal would launch a new global 
scenario in which Genoa could extend its «frontiers» and play a key role as a broker 
between East and West, with obvious benefits in terms of trade, power, and prestige:
En étendant ainsì jusque de l’autre coté de l’Atlantique sa frontiere maritime, la Sardaigne 
ferait de Gênes un vaste entrepot de denrées coloniales, ou tout le Mediterranée viandra s’appro-
visionner. En étendant sa frontiere de terre jusq’à la Suisse et à l’Allemagne, la Sardaigne appelle 
à Genes un grande partie de l’émigration qui a lieu, si considérablement, tous les ans, d’Europe 
en Amérique […] Gênes serait placée au premeir rang des ports de commerce du monde28.
This time the Chamber of Commerce conceded that the project had potential. In 
the light of the railway under construction connecting Genoa with Piedmont, Swit-
zerland, and Lake Costance, 
le periodiche corse transatlantiche potrebbero divenire potenti anelli ad una importante cat-
ena, che annodando infinite ramificazioni di corrispondenze e di viaggiatori derivanti e dalla 
Alemagna, e dalla Svizzera, e da tutta l’Italia alimentata [sic] la speranza di veder concentrate 
in Genova operazioni di grande rilievo, e di utilità tanto pubblica che privata. 
Yet, Le Chevalier’s plan was rejected on the grounds that government subsi-
dies to steamers were detrimental to «il deposito di Genova e la navigazione a vela 
nazionale»29. 
In sum, all these proposals encountered the same objections with which the Cham-
ber of Commerce had opposed Garibaldi’s plans: the volume of trade was scarce, the 
investments required by the steamship business were excessive, and the concession 
of exclusive licenses on transatlantic routes would violate fair competition and dam-
age sail navigation Only the shockwaves of the 1848 revolutions could overcome 
these arguments and lead to a public conversation on the merits of the Piedmontese 
engagement with the Atlantic world. 
27 Asg, Camera di Commercio, box 509, 4 november 1842.
28 Ast, Marina – Commercio e Navigazione, box 501.
29 Asg, Camera di Commercio, box 512, 16 november 1847. 
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«Una nazione potente e generosa»
Immediately after 1848, as Piedmont’s quest for hegemony came to be increasingly 
associated with liberal economic reform, free trade and improvements in infrastruc-
ture became a hotly debated issue both in political circles and among the public. First 
as a representative in Parliament and, after 1850, as Secretary of Commerce and later 
of the Navy, Cavour became the most authoritative proponent of a vision in which 
economic progress and nation building were closely intertwined30. Moving beyond 
traditional Mediterranean boundaries and engaging with the Atlantic world were 
crucial to that vision. The goal was to integrate Piedmont and eventually Italy into an 
international economy in which transatlantic exchanges were on the rise. From this 
perspective, free trade was considered more instrumental than laissez-faire. Chal-
lenging protectionist customs legislation, which was key for increasing exports, went 
hand in hand with public investments in transportation. 
With Cavour’s rise to power, analyses and proposals stemming from the scholarly 
debate came to shape the economic policies of the Kingdom of Sardinia31. But two ex-
ternal factors also played a role. First, orderly economic progress was seen as all the 
more urgent in liberal circles after the French events of 1848 generated widespread 
fears of social revolution. Second, as the United States was emerging as an example of 
political and economic modernity attracting a rising number of European migrants, 
the Atlantic space became an opportunity for a wider array of economic actors. On 
both sides of the Atlantic migration came to be seen not only a profitable choice, 
but also as stabilizing factor for European societies. As Nathaniel Niles, US chargé 
d’affaires in Turin, wrote to Secretary of State John Clayton in February 1850:
If some great system of emigration for the Latin races is not soon entered upon according 
to the suggestion of Mr. D’Azeglio, nothing better presents itself to the Central and Southern 
nations of Europe than the cruel alternative of accepting as a permanent principle of policy 
the cutting of each other’s throat, or in other words of making habitual war on each other32.
 This change of mindset became evident in December 1849 when the Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs asked the Sardinian consul in New York, Luigi Mossi, to provide a list 
of technical, commercial, and financial information on the feasibility of a steamship 
line between Genoa and Philadelphia or, alternatively, Havana. Mossi was asked, 
among other things, if «una linea che partendo da Genova e toccando Madera, le Az-
zorre riuscisse a Filadelfia offrirebbe mediante l’afflusso delle merci degli stati merid-
30 R. Romeo, Cavour e il suo tempo, vol. II, cit., pp. 463-467; G. Pescosolido, Unità nazionale e sviluppo 
economico, 1750-1913, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1998, pp. 58-66.
31 R. Romani, L’economia politica del Risorgimento italiano, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 1994, pp. 183-187.
32 National Archives and Record Administration [hereafter: Nara], College Patk (MD), RG 59, Diplomatic 
dispatches – Sardinia, Niles to Secretary of State, 24 february 1850. 
165
ionali uguali o migliori probabilità di lucro che non prendendo l’Avana per termine 
del viaggio». He was also asked to act with discretion and find potential partners for 
such an enterprise: 
Senza accennare ad alcuna istruzione ricevuta, ed unicamente come se si trattasse di pro-
pria idea, ella [esplorasse] l’opinione delle persone di maggiore credito nel commercio e po-
tenza nel Governo onde rilevare se sarebbero o no disposte ad associarsi a tale impresa, ed 
in qual modo e misura. Converrà conoscere se non possa pel nostro progetto ricavarsi alcuna 
utilità dalla brama che avrebbe a sorgere facilmente in Filadelfia di farsi centro di tutte le op-
erazioni con il Mediterraneo ed il Sud dell’Europa, come Nuova York lo è delle comunicazioni 
nordiche del nostro continente, e se da tale brama non sia per risultare rivalità a gara d’offerte 
alla società da fondarsi33.
In his reply Mossi emphasized three points: the high costs of steamship navigation, 
which would require government subsidies; the difficulty of finding private funds in 
the US due to a chronic lack of capital, which was often provided by British investors; 
and, finally, the need to choose New York over Philadelphia as the terminus: «New 
York è il grande centro commerciale di tutta l’America settentrionale. Le sue im-
mense comunicazioni col Pacifico, col Golfo del Messico e coll’Europa la mettono in 
grado di fornire passeggeri e mercanzie più di ogni altra città dell’Unione»34.
By then, the axis of transatlantic exchanges had started moving north, thanks in 
part to the booming steamship business that in the US was facilitated by the increase 
in foreign trade, improvements in boat construction, and lavish government sub-
sidies. Tonnage increased from about 5.000 tons in 1847 to almost 100.000 in 1860. 
By the late 1850s, federal subsidies amounted to over 14 million dollars. The major 
beneficiaries were the Ocean Steam Navigation Company, which operated on the 
routes between New York and Bremen and, later, Le Havre, from 1847 onward, and 
especially the Collins Line operating on the New York–Liverpool route, which would 
become the terrain of intense competition with Britain’s Cunard Line. However, the 
motives behind the US steamship boom were not exclusively economic. Challenging 
British hegemony over the Atlantic, pursuing national prestige, and displaying Amer-
ican technological progress also played a role and strongly resonated with members 
of Congress at a time when the assertive projection of American power was exem-
plified by the war against Mexico and the notion of manifest destiny35. The motives 
33 Ast, Consolati nazionali in generale, vol. 75, 4 december 1849. At the same time similar attempt was 
made with Spain concerning a line to Havana.
34 Ast, Consolati nazionali – New York, 19 february 1850.
35 G Taylor, Transportation revolution, cit., pp. 116-122, 128-131; J. Schroeder, Shaping a maritime empire, 
cit., pp. 88-99; A. Stephanson. Manifest destiny. American expansion and the empire of right, New York, Hill 
& Wang, 1995. Collins Line was the common name for the New York and Liverpool United States Mail 
Steamship Company.
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behind Sardinian efforts to develop steamship lines were not very different in kind, 
though very different in degree and outcome. 
After 1848 things were slowly changing in Genoa as well. By late 1850 Michele 
Erede, an influential Genoese economist recently converted to Cobden’s free trade 
theories, would write to Cavour about the need to establish a commercial house «con 
diramazioni figliali negli Stati Uniti e a Londra» but that government support would 
be fundamental if they wished to compete with «i costumi commerciali d’Inghilterra 
ed America». As he wrote, «io temo forte, visto il personale del commercio, che que’ 
popoli, in questa parte, possano dirsi vigorosi atleti a petto di bambini che mal si 
reggono in piedi, di guisa che a volere che si sviluppino presto e bene tanti nostri 
latenti fattori economici sarebbe ancora necessaria l’azione governativa sotto più di 
un rapporto»36. 
A key figure of mid-19th-century Genoese political life, Domenico Elena, was more 
straightforward with Cavour. In June 1851 he asked him to support the New York-
Genoa steamship proposal about to be submitted to the Piedmontese government by 
the Livingston & Wells company. There was more at stake than just the obvious com-
mercial returns, Elena wrote: «Lascio S.S. a il calcolare l’utilità politica che avremmo 
da un sistema di relazioni di simile natura con una nazione potente e generosa, la 
quale sa di non poter avere in Italia altro amico che noi». Cavour replied that he 
would do all he could «per far sì che il porto di Genova sia il primo nel Mediteraneo 
[sic] a essere posto in comunicazione colla metropoli dell’America»37. The efforts of 
the New York-based company, supported by the US chargé d’affaires in Turin Wil-
liam Kinney, formed the prologue to the final chapter of this long series of real and 
imagined projects and false starts: the establishment of the Compagnia transatlantica 
di navigazione a vapore in 185238. 
In late July both the official paper of the Kingdom of Sardinia, the «Gazzetta Pie-
montese», and the democratic-leaning «Italia e Popolo», based in Genoa, reported with 
great fanfare the establishment in New York of «una Compagnia di navigazione a va-
pore transatlantica che toccando Madera (in coincidenza colla linea inglese diretta 
all’America del Sud) farà quindi capo a Genova». The papers also published the con-
tractual terms proposed by the Sardinian ministry of Commerce, which granted the 
company an exclusive 15-year license and, at the same time, listed conditions and re-
36 Erede to Cavour, 17 november 1850 in R. Roccia (a cura di), Epistolario, vol. VII, Firenze, Olschki, 1983, 
pp. 350-352, 362-367.
37 Elena to Cavour, 9 june 1851 and Cavour to Elena, 11 june 1851, in C. Pischedda (a cura di), Epistolario, 
vol. VIII, Firenze, Olschki, 1983, pp. 203, 206.
38 New Jersey Historical Society, Newark (NJ), William Kinney Papers, box 3, Kinney to Cavour, June 7 
1851. On the role played by Kinney see H. Marraro, Italians in New York in the Eighteen Fifties, «New York 
History», 1949, 3, pp. 295-297.
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quirements concerning the production of ships, the Mediterranean and Atlantic routes, 
the share capital, the number of trips per year, and the number of passengers per trip39. 
Shortly thereafter Kinney informed Secretary of State Daniel Webster of the pro-
ject, underscoring the public support it had received: «The prospect of such a com-
munication is regarded with much popular favor here, where there is a prevailing 
desire for more intimate intercourse with the United States». In the same dispatch 
he also analyzed at length the possible implications of the commercial treaty be-
tween Piedmont and Switzerland for US exports of cotton and tobacco in light of the 
forthcoming construction of a railway connecting the two countries, which Kinney 
believed would facilitate communications between Genoa and the German states of 
the Zollverein40. This was a time when, as a consequence of the revolutionary tur-
moil of 1848 and technological improvements in communication, European events 
were widely covered in the American press and, in the process, interest in the affairs 
of Italian states was increasing. In June 1851 Piedmont was the first Italian stop on 
the European trip of «New York Herald» founder and editor Horace Greeley. Close to 
the Whig party and, a few years later, among the founders of the Republican party, 
Greeley was likely the most influential journalist of mid-19th-century America. In 
his travelogue Glances at Europe he joined other American observers in portraying 
the Piedmontese constitutional monarchy as one of the few encouraging signs within 
a context of European instability and Italian backwardness. Greeley also believed 
that investments in infrastructure like the Turin-Genoa line then under construction 
represented a crucial step toward stability and prosperity:
This road will connect with those of France and Germany by a tunnel through some one 
of the Alps (the Mount Cenis is now under consideration) but, even without that, whenever it 
shall have reached the base of the Alps on this side and been responded to by similar exten-
sions of the French and Rhine-valley railroads on the other, Genoa will supplant Marseilles 
while continuing preferable to Trieste as the point of embarkation from Cairo and Suez on the 
direct route from England and Paris for India, China and Sothern Asia41.
A series of «New York Times» reports from Italy magnified the economic and civil 
progress of Sardinia, described as living proof that Europe could partially and gradu-
ally overcome its tainted past. One of these stories credited Cavour with the wise and 
enlightened reforms that were making Piedmont an exception in a country still domi-
nated by tyranny: «Sardinia is to Italy what the United States are to Cuba or Hayti»42.
39 «Gazzetta Piemontese», 23 july 1851; «Italia e popolo», 25 july 1851.
40 Nara, RG 59, Diplomatic Dispatches – Sardinia, Kinney to Secretary of State, 19 April and 4 August 1851. 
41 H. Greeley, Glances at Europe, New York, Dewitt & Davenport, 1851, pp. 180-81.
42 Affairs in Italy, «New York Daily Times», 4 may 1852. 
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These fragments fit into a larger pattern in which American interpretations of 
the «distant revolutions» of 1848 were appropriated in a domestic feud over national 
identity. European progress served a view of the American experiment as a univer-
sally replicable model, while European failure reinforced the dichotomist framework 
pitting the New World against the Old43. Like religious freedom and constitutional 
principles, railways and steamers were part of a liberal discourse based on shared 
notions of progress and civilization and thus became part of the mid-19th-century 
redefinition of the Atlantic world.
The «New York Times» also reported that Cavour hoped Livingston & Wells would 
succeed in obtaining from the US Congress the same conditions granted by the Pied-
montese government. In the meantime, however, the Senate’s Committee on Naval 
Affairs had just rejected the petition presented by New York senator Hamilton Fish44. 
This setback put an end to the plans of the New York-based company and paved the 
way for a group of ship owners led by Raffaele Rubattino, who was emerging as the 
symbol of a new era of cooperation between Cavour’s Piedmont and the Genoese 
business community. 
By the early 1850s, Cavour’s pursuit of nation building through economic reform 
finally seemed to be compatible with the aspirations and interests of the Genoese 
business community. Several ambitious investment projects thus ensued: the estab-
lishment of the Ansaldo company; the development of a railway network, starting 
with the Turin-Genoa line; improvements of the docks in Genoa; and subsidies for 
navigation lines connecting Genoa with Sardinia and eventually Tunisia. Part and 
parcel of this effort was investment in transatlantic steamship navigation which Ca-
vour, unlike others, considered crucial. As he wrote to Rubattino, whose priority was 
the Mediterranean line, «tra pochi giorni devo presentare alle Camere il contratto 
colla Compagnia transatlantica, che impone un carico non lieve alle finanze; non 
posso renderlo più grave con la richiesta di un altro sussidio per un servizio di im-
portanza secondaria»45. 
For Cavour, such public investment would allow him to build bridges with the 
Genoa-based business community, which was key for making Piedmont a major 
player at the Italian and European levels46. Some of the biggest financial, industrial, 
and ship owning names comprising that community (Rubattino, Carlo Bombrini, 
Giacomo Oneto, and Filippo Penco) were also on the board of the Transtlantica, 
43 T. Roberts, Distant revolutions. 1848 and the challenge to American exceptionalism, Charlottesville, Uni-
versity of Virginia Press, 2009; P. Gemme, Domesticating foreign struggles. Italian Risorgimento and ante-
bellum American identity, Athens, University of Georgia Press, 2005.
44 «Journal of the Senate», 16 february 1852; «New York Times», 17 february 1852; «New York Daily Trib-
une», 23 march 1852. See also Nara, RG 46, Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, Sen32A-H13, 5 march 1852. 
45 Cavour to Rubattino, 28 december 1852, in C. Pischedda (a cura di), Epistolario, vol. IX, Firenze, Olschki, 
1984, pp. 317-318.
46 G. Doria, Investimenti e sviluppo economico, cit.; R. Romeo, Cavour e il suo tempo, vol. II, cit.
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which was created in October 1852 with a share capital of 10 million lire. In July 
1853 the Piedmontese parliament approved a bill granting subsidies to the company 
and regulating its operations. A North Atlantic route to New York and a South Atlantic 
route to Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo were to be activated with the number of pas-
sengers not to exceed 80 in the cabins and 100 on deck. In case of war, the govern-
ment had the right to use its ships in exchange for an indemnity. The government 
subsidy amounted to 624.000 lire. 
The parliamentary debate around the bill clearly shows why and to what extent 
this Atlantic venture was openly discussed as an opportunity. The bill was introduced 
in the lower chamber by Luigi Torelli, a representative from Lombardy who had just 
introduced a similar bill for the construction of a railway between Novara and Lake 
Maggiore based on a detailed and comprehensive analysis of migration from Switzer-
land and Southern Germany to the Americas:
Mi è d’uopo anzitutto – Torelli remarked – dare un’idea a chi forse non l’avesse ab-
bastanza chiara, di un fatto che si compie da qualche anno in Europa ed in proporzioni gi-
gantesche; voglio dire il fatto dell’emigrazione dall’Europa all’America. Già da lungo tempo 
essa si verifica, ma non sono che circa 18 e 20 anni che si riproduce sopra una scala che può 
chiamarsi veramente straordinaria ed in una misura fuori di proporzione con quella degli anni 
che precedettero quest’epoca.
Transcending traditional Mediterranean-centered mental maps and understanding 
the Atlantic basin as an opportunity underscored the importance of investments in in-
frastructure connecting Piedmont with Central Europe. According to Torelli, the transit 
of goods through Piedmont would increase dramatically and, thanks to the flow of 
passengers, Genoa could become a sort of Mediterranean Liverpool. As he concluded: 
Ho l’intimo convincimento che i tre quarti di quelli che sono imbarcati ad Havre-de-Grace 
sarebbero venuti a Genova laddove avesse esistito questa via [sic], e come Liverpool vide lo 
scorso anno imbarcarsi 200.000 e più emigranti, ossia i due terzi di quanti emigrano dal Regno 
Unito, Genova vedrebbe imbarcarsi forse l’eguale proporzione di quanti emigrano dalla Ger-
mania e dalla Svizzera, e questo poi in modo certo, qualora noi adottassimo la misura seguita 
da tutte le strade ferrate della Germania, di offrire, cioè, un ribasso di prezzo per gli emigranti47.
A decade in which 30.000 Sardinian subjects would travel to the Americas had 
just begun. Piedmontese consuls in the US started requesting more resources to cope 
with the increase in migrants and goods, and routinely reported on the violation of 
American immigration laws on the part of vessels from Genoa48. When Torelli made 
47 Atti della Camera dei Deputati, Regno di Sardegna, IV legislatura, 30 april 1853.
48 Early cases of Sardinian vessels charged of violating measures passed by the US Congress in 1847 and 
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his case for the bill on the Compagnia transatlantica in May 1853, he once again em-
phasized how transatlantic flows of goods and people overlapped and how the local 
and Atlantic scales were connected. 
For his part, Cavour was primarily intent on countering objections regarding the 
financial sustainability of the project and stressed in his speech that the postal ser-
vice and remittances from South America would guarantee revenues. However, his 
reliance on emigrationist arguments also served the larger goal of «sviluppare tutti 
gli elementi di progresso che possiede il nostro Stato». He went on to argue that, in 
this view, the Genoa-New York line was a «servizio pubblico» to the extent that «lo 
stabilimento di un servizio a vapore, ad ore e giorno fissi, è in certo modo come la 
costruzione di una strada ferrata in certe date condizioni». He argued that if spending 
national resources was justifiable in the case of the line to Tunis, it was even more 
justifiable for the transatlantic line. 
Finally, this Sardinian attempt to engage in the competition and seize the oppor-
tunities provided by transatlantic steamship navigation was based on considerations 
of power and status. In the words of representative Carlo Cadorna, the enterprise 
would «sviluppare e accrescere […] la forza morale e materiale» of the Kingdom and, 
eventually, lead to military benefits49.
The Chamber approved the bill with 83 votes against 30 within a climate of opinion 
heavily influenced by a special interest campaign behind the enterprise. Études sur la 
navigation transatlantique, a volume indirectly sponsored by the company, extolled 
the virtues of transatlantic steamship navigation. Trade and prestige, emigration 
and business, old maritime traditions and new ambitions merged within a narrative 
aimed at promoting the placement of the company’s stock options on the financial 
markets.50 Pamphlets and newspaper articles signaled how the notion of the Atlantic 
space as an opportunity made its way in the public opinion. 
The beginnings seemed encouraging. Markets in Turin and Milan as well as Brit-
ish banks like Draper Pieroni reacted positively, thus allowing the company to build 
its first two steamers almost immediately. However, as is well known, the Transat-
lantica ended in failure soon thereafter. Management of the company was less than 
transparent and the early enthusiasm of investors quickly evaporated. Finally, not 
only did the Crimean War direct the appetites of the Genoese business establishment 
eastward, but it also diverted state resources and re-established war and diplomacy 
1848 restricting access of foreign passengers to US ports are discussed in Ast, Marina, box 503 and Asg, 
Camera di Commercio, minutes of meeting, box 513, 15 may 1849. 
49 Atti della Camera dei Deputati, Regno di Sardegna, IV legislatura, 31 may 1853. On the expansion-
ist implications of this Atlantic projection see F. Surdich, I viaggi, i commerci, le colonie: radici locali 
dell’iniziativa espansionista, in A. Gibelli, P. Rugafiori (a cura di), Storia d’Italia, cit.; M. Ferrari, Emigrazi-
one e colonie. Il giornale genovese La Borsa, 1865-1894, Genova, Bozzi, 1983. 
50 De Jessè Charleval, Études sur la navigation transatlantique, Turin, Typographie du Progres, 1853. See 
also Navigazione. Commercio. Le grandi strade marittime e i pachebotti a vapore, Genova, Tip. Botto, 1852. 
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as the tools of choice of Piedmontese nation building. While the company did oper-
ate a few trips along the South Atlantic line starting in late 1856, the North Atlantic 
line was never even activated. The decision to rent the only two available steamers 
to France in 1855 rather than employ them along the transatlantic routes, as agreed 
with the Sardinian government, was profitable in the short term, but eventually ac-
celerated the company’s decline. After several breaches of contract and government 
interventions to prevent bankruptcy, the company was liquidated in 185951.
Conclusion
The story of transatlantic steamship navigation in the Kingdom of Sardinia is sig-
nificant not for its achievements but for the light it sheds on a dense web of commer-
cial exchanges, political relations, cultural assumptions, and individual experiences 
that in Sardinia, as elsewhere in Europe, converged within a new vision of «America» 
as an opportunity. Among policy-makers as well as in the public discourse America 
was a polysemic term that could refer to the US, South America, the Americas, or the 
vast, indefinite space beyond the Atlantic. Between the Restoration years and Italian 
unification this changing, protean Atlantic space largely stopped being associated 
with materialistic barbarism and subversion and acquired new positive connota-
tions. Now the New World was not only a destination for migrants and a market 
for merchants, but also a political experiment to be taken seriously, a commercial 
and financial player to engage with and selectively imitate, and a testing ground for 
the commercial and political ambitions of an increasing number of Europeans. As 
elsewhere, in Sardinia «America» was seen as closer than before and increasingly 
connected to local realities; it was a meta-geographic notion whose changing con-
tours were increasingly recognized both in the public opinion and among those who 
practiced or imagined transatlantic crossings. For a brief span of time such Atlantic 
projection overlapped with and contributed to an understanding of nation-building 
that was based on trade and modernization more than on diplomacy and war. 
Within the Italian context, understanding America as an opportunity reflected and 
reinforced a re-orientation of mental maps that was by no means limited to Turin and 
Genoa. In fact this new Atlantic outlook was, on the one hand, the outcome of broad, 
complex processes that were recasting transatlantic relations at a crucial phase of 
economic globalization; on the other hand, it reflected a growing, multifaceted, and 
often contradictory interest in the United States as an experiment in modernity, a 
metaphor for the future, or a reference against which to measure oneself, as argued 
51 G. Doria, Investimenti e sviluppo economico, cit.; G. Giacchero, Genova e Liguria nell’età contemporanea, 
vol. 1, Genova, Sagep, 1980, pp. 247-257; R. Romeo, Cavour e il suo tempo, vol. III, 1854-1861, Roma-Bari, 
Laterza, 1984.
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by several influential voices of the Risorgimento52. At this time, however, in Genoa 
and Turin the idea of America as an opportunity gained significant traction for three 
reasons: the early familiarity of Ligurians with Atlantic commercial and migratory 
routes; the post-1848 liberal turn and the international projection of Piedmont; and, 
finally, the influence of the debate among economists on Piedmontese policies. As a 
consequence, America became part of concrete experiences of competition, emula-
tion, comparison, and exchange both inside and outside the circle of political, eco-
nomic, and intellectual elites. With the ocean suddenly seeming narrower, transat-
lantic connections multiplied and mindsets changed. The discourse paving the way 
to the Compagnia transatlantica reflected this real and imagined transformation, not-
withstanding the failure of the enterprise. 
The tangle of interests and values surrounding transatlantic steamship navigation 
ultimately intersected with the Risorgimento in two major ways. First, thinking of 
America as an opportunity helped shape an idea of national identity based on ex-
change, more than antagonism, with the other. The statesmen, merchants, consuls, 
intellectuals, investors, and migrants we have met in these pages helped form a no-
tion of Italy as being in interaction with the Atlantic world, rather than in opposition 
to it53. An Atlantic re-orientation of Italian mental maps had started, «America» would 
not return to be a distant periphery. Second, transatlantic steamship navigation be-
came part of the nation building process as an extension of the railway network. 
Charles Maier has shown how in the 19th century railways transformed the space 
within national borders into a social and economic, as well as political, unit54. Both 
short-haul and transatlantic steamers were part of this process and illustrated its 
nationalist implications. In this respect, Rubattino’s role in the Compagnia transat-
lantica foreshadowed his involvement in the origins of Italian colonialism and, more 
importantly, the structural limitations that led to the failure of this enterprise antici-
pated and encapsulated later, wider shortcomings of Italian modernization.
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